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‘Communication to the Public’ in FAPL v QC Leisure and Murphy v Media Protection Services 
(Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08) 
 
Enrico Bonadio – Mauro Santo * 
 
Abstract 
On 4 October 2011 the Court of Justice of the European Union released its decision in FAPL v QC Leisure 
and Murphy v Media Protection Services (Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08). Amongst the many 
aspects dealt with, the Court gave its interpretation of ‘communication to the public’ under Article 3(1) of the 
Info Society Directive and concluded that the showing of live Premier League matches in pubs does amount 
to such communication. 
 
Introduction and legal framework 
This case originates from UK legal proceedings. A first set of proceedings was instituted in the UK by inter 
alia the Football Association Premier League Ltd (FAPL), which organizes the filming of Premier League 
matches and the licensing of the rights to broadcast them. These proceedings refer to the use of foreign 
decoder cards in the UK to access foreign satellite transmissions of live Premier Leagues football matches. 
FAPL was convinced that this activity infringed its copyrights on various works embodied in the matches. 
Two actions had been instituted against suppliers of foreign decoder cards to bars and pubs and another 
action had been brought against licensees and publicans who showed live matches broadcast on the 
channels of a foreign broadcaster. A referral was then made to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) (Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure, Case C-403/08). A second proceeding was 
instituted by Media Protection Services Ltd (entrusted by FAPL to monitor the use of satellite systems which 
broadcast Premier League football matches illegally) against a publican, Ms Karen Murphy, who showed 
Premier League football matches in her pub by using a Greek decoder card. The latter was fined on the 
ground that the above decoder card was an illicit access device. Ms Murphy appealed to the High Court, 
which then referred the case to the CJEU (Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, Case C-429/08). 
The CJEU then heard and decided the cases jointly. 
On 4 October 2011 the CJEU released its decision. Among the many issues dealt with (including conditional 
access devices, temporary storage and reproduction rights, free movement of services and competition 
aspects), the Court interpreted the concept of “communication to the public” under Article 3(1) of the 
Directive 2001/29 (“Info Society Directive”) 1. As is known, authors are given an exclusive right to authorise 
or prohibit such act. On 3 February 2011 the Advocate General, Professor Juliane Kokott, had stated in her 
opinion that the showing of live football matches in pubs does not amount to “communication to the public”2. 
                                                        
Enrico Bonadio is Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law at City University London (City Law School). Mauro Santo is an Intellectual 
Property Attorney at M&R Europe Intellectual Property Legal Advisors, Milan (Italy). Comments are welcome and should be sent to 
‘enrico.bonadio.1@city.ac.uk’ and ‘mauro.santo@mrelaw.com’.  
1
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10, 22.6.2001.  
2
 On the part of the opinion related to this point see Enrico Bonadio, ‘Communication to the Public’ in FAPL v QC Leisure and Murphy v 
Media Protection Services: the Advocate General’s Opinion, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2011, p. 370-371; Tanya 
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The CJEU took an opposite stance, concluding that such showing has to be interpreted as “communication 
to the public” under the provision in question.  
The other provisions quoted and commented by the CJEU were Recital 23 of the Info Society Directive and 
Article 11-bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention3. In particular, the latter provides that authors are given the 
exclusive right to authorise “the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument 
transmitting, by signs, sound or images, the broadcast of the work”. 
 
Analysis 
In essence the question posed to the Court was whether “communication to the public” within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of the Info Society Directive must be interpreted as covering transmission of broadcast works, via 
television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house. This is an important issue, 
because – as already mentioned – copyright owners such as FAPL are offered an exclusive right to 
authorize or prohibit this act. 
 
Broad interpretation of “communication to the public” 
 
The CJEU first recalled that the Info-Society Directive does not provide a definition of “communication to the 
public”4. It then stressed that the latter must be interpreted in the light of the following: 
(i) the objectives of the Info Society Directive and the context of the provision, i.e. a high level of 
protection of the authors, as it is confirmed by the above mentioned Recital 23: such recital 
states that the author’s right of communication to the public “… should be understood in a broad 
sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place where the 
communication originates …”. It thus provides authors with a high level of protection, so as to 
permit them to get a fair reward for the use of their works5. 
(ii) the principles and rules laid down in other copyright-related directives, including Directive 92/100 
on Related Rights (as is also mentioned in Recital 20 of the Info Society Directive) as well as 
Article 11-bis(1) of the Berne Convention6. 
In particular, the CJEU recalled that a similar concept of “communication to the public” is defined in Article 
8(3) of the Related Rights Directive 7 : “Member States shall provide for broadcasting organizations the 
exclusive right to authorize or prohibit … the communication to the public of their broadcast, if such 
communication is made in places accessible to the public …”. Moreover, the Court stressed, it is clear from 
the above provision as well as from Articles 2(g) and 15 of the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty 
that the concept of communication to the public includes “…making the sounds or representations of sounds 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Aplin, ”Reproduction” and “Communication to the Public” Right in EU Copyright Law: FAPL v QC Leisure, King’s Law Journal, 2011, 22, 
pp. 215-219.  
3
 Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works (Paris text 1971).  
4
 See paragraph 184 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
5
 See paragraph 186 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
6
 See paragraphs 187 and 189 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
7
 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property, OJ L 346/61, 27.11.1992, repealed by Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006, on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property, OJ L 376/28, 27.12.2006. 
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fixed in a phonogram audible to the public and that it encompasses broadcasting or any communication to 
the public …”8. As mentioned above, the CJEU also took into consideration Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne 
Convention. According to the Court, this provision clarifies that the concept in question includes 
“communication by loudspeaker or any other instrument transmitting by signs, sounds or images, covering … 
a means of communication such as display of the works on a screen” 9: and this is a scenario comparable to 
the case at issue - it includes the presentation of radio or TV programmes in places where people gather, 
such as bars, restaurants, hotels, cafes, trains, etc. In this specific regard, it should be noted that in her 
opinion the Advocate General had taken a different view, by stating that Article 3 of the Info Society Directive 
does not include the acts referred to in Article 11-bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention. In particular, Professor 
Kokott had held that the latter provision had not been transposed into EU law, and specifically into the Info 
Society Directive, as Article 3(1) of such Directive was intended to specifically implement Article 8 of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, that omits to mention communication to the public by means of public 
presentation10. In its final ruling the CJEU took a different view. It held in essence that the concept of 
“communication to the public” referred to in the above provision of the Berne Convention was not different 
from the concept referred to in Article 3 of the Info Society Directive (in other words: the latter should be 
considered as an implementation of the former). It follows, according to the Court, that the concept of 
communication to the public must be interpreted broadly, and in particular as referring to any transmission of 
the protected works, irrespective of the technical means or process used11. 
 
Analogies with SGAE v Rafael Hoteles 
 
The CJEU quoted SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles (C-306/05) 12 . In the latter case the Court gave a broad 
interpretation of “communication to the public”. It held that a hotel proprietor carries out an act of 
communication when he gives his customers access to the broadcast works via television sets, by 
distributing in the hotel rooms, with full knowledge of the position, the signal received carrying the protected 
works. This act indeed refers to any indeterminate number of viewers. It is for this reason that the distribution 
of a signal by means of television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is 
used to transmit the signal, constitutes communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 
Info Society Directive. The facts of SGAE v Rafael Hoteles therefore – according to the CJEU - are 
comparable to the facts in the present case. As a matter of fact, the proprietor of a public house intentionally 
gives the customers present in that establishment access to a broadcast containing protected works via a 
television screen and speakers. And, as in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles, without the intervention of the 
                                                        
8
 See paragraph 191 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
9
 See paragraph 192 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
10
 Such interpretation is supported by Aplin, quoted above at note 2, p. 216. Indeed, she takes the view that “the ECJ should follow the 
Advocate General on this question and conclude that Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC does not embrace the acts that fall within Article 
11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention. The express language of the relevant provisions supports this interpretation. … the provision 
relates to communication or reception in public. Whereas it is clear from the language of Article 3 and Recital 23 … that the Directive is 
seeking to harmonise communication to the public and is not seeking to address communication in public.”. 
11
 See paragraph 193 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
12
 Case C-306/05 - Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, CJEU decision of 7 December 
2006, OJ C 331/3, 30.12.2006. 
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establishment’s owner, the customers could not enjoy the works broadcast, even if they are physically within 
the broadcast’s catchment area13. 
 
Meaning of “public” 
 
The CJEU made clear that, in order for there to be a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of the Info Society Directive, it is also necessary for the work broadcast to be transmitted to a 
new public, i.e. “to a public which was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when 
they authorised their use by the communication to the original public” 14. The Court indeed held that authors 
authorise a broadcast of their works only to the owners of television sets who, either personally or within their 
own private or family circles, receive the signal and follow the broadcasts. And, the CJEU pointed out, where 
a broadcast work is transmitted, in a place accessible to the public, for an additional public which is allowed 
by the owner of the television set to hear or see the work, an intentional intervention of that kind must be 
deemed as an act through which the work in question is communicated to a new public15.  
The CJEU also recalled that - in order for there to be a ‘communication to the public’ - the work broadcast 
has to be transmitted to a “public not present at the place where the communication originates”, as required 
by Recital 23 of the Info Society Directive. Of course, the above concept does not refer to direct 
performances or representations, i.e. when the public is in direct physical contact with the actor performer. 
And the element of “direct physical contact” is clearly absent in case of public houses which transmit 
broadcast works via television screen and speakers to a public which is just present at the place of that 
transmission, but not at the place where the communication takes origin, i.e. at the place of the 
representation or performance which is broadcast16. This part of the CJEU’s decision is at odds with AG’s 
opinion, according to which the requirement in question would not be met in the case at issue: indeed, in her 
eyes, where pub landlords show TV programmes to their customers, the relevant public would be present at 
the place where the communication originates, as such communication should be considered as taking origin 
in TV screens, and not at the place where the represented or performed event takes place17. 
 
Profit-making nature of the communication 
 
The CJEU also held that the fact that in the case at issue the owner of the pub transmits the broadcast works 
with a view to making profits cannot be considered irrelevant: such transmissions are indeed liable to 
increase pubs’ customers and thus publicans’ financial results. The profit making nature of such activity has 
                                                        
13
 See paragraphs 194-195 of the CJEU’s ruling. 
14
 See paragraph 197 of the CJEU’s ruling. See also the Court’s decision in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles (paragraphs 40 and 42), quoted 
above at note 12.  
15
 See paragraph 198 of the CJEU’s ruling. See also the Court’s decision in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles (paragraph 41) quoted above at 
note 12.  
16
 See paragraph 200-203 of the CJEU’s ruling. See also the Court’s decision in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles (paragraph 40) quoted above 
at note 12.  
17
 See paragraph 144 of the Advocate General’s Opinion. The view taken by the AG is also shared by Aplin, quoted above at note 2, p. 
218. 
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therefore to be taken into consideration when it comes to applying and interpreting Article 3(1) of the Info 
Society Directive18. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In the case at issue the CJEU gave a broad interpretation of “communication to the public” and by doing so 
confirmed SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles. It seems that the legal reasoning given by the Court – focused on the 
need to ensure to the fullest the protection of authors’ exclusive right to authorize any diffusion of their work - 
is clearer than AG’s one. The CJEU relied on a systematic interpretation of EU copyright law, by also 
referring to the concept of “communication to the public” in Article 8(3) of the Related Rights Directive. It also 
relied on analogous provisions of the Berne Convention and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms 
Treaty. The Court’s decision is also important as it clarifies a relevant issue: i.e. the meaning of “public”. 
                                                        
18
 See paragraphs 204-206 of the CJEU’s ruling. See also SGAE v Rafael Hoteles, quoted above at note 12, in which however the 
Court clarified that “the pursuit of profit is not a necessary condition for the existence of a communication to the public” (paragraph 44). 
